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As to the origin of  social pragmatics, it can be partly found in the study of human behavior in
general (by sociologists, psychologists, economists, rhetoricians, and so on), partly in the interest
that linguists developed in the various forms of socially oriented and colored language use (such as
dialects). With regard to the former, its scientific interest remained purely static-descriptive (as in
the disciplines, now mostly obsolete, of sociometrics and sociography). In particular, the study of
variation in language was either perceived against a historical background, or studied in the context
of modern society; these interests crystallized respectively around the kernel disciplines of historical
dialectology (with its emphasis on "Wörter und Sachen", in the tradition of the Swiss dialectologist
Jakob Jud; 1882-1952), and around the burgeoning discipline of sociolinguistics in its extended
form, where the object of study included not only the regional dialects of a language, but also other,
socially stratified and gender-determined varieties of speaking, later augmented by an interest in
professional speech, religious discourse, baby, children’s and adolescents' talk, speech characteristic
of certain current genres (such as rapping), and so on. 
It is customary to partition this union set of social, behavioral, psychological, economic and
linguistic interests in language according to whether they consider themselves either as  linguistic
theories informed by a social, psychological, economical etc. point of view, or as theories of the
phenomena in question as subsumed under a social perspective. In the first case, we usually refer to
these theories as belonging to sociolinguistics, while in the second case, we talk about the sociology
of language. Unfortunately, I think that this distinction, while practically motivated as a division of
labor, does not make much sense in a wider, theoretical perspective. First off, the social linguistic
phenomena can be theoretically distinguished, but not be separated in the real world. And then, the
other way around, since all language presupposes a social formation, both for its origin and for its
use, human social formations cannot historically be imagined without the use of language.
The early sociologists of language concentrated on description. According to the Nestor of
North American researchers in the field, Joshua Fishman (1926-), what is needed is "a reliable and
insightful description of any existing patterns of social organization in language use and behavior
toward language" (Fishman 1972: 47; emphasis original). Such patterns are drawn upon in attitudes
and policies  towards phenomena such as  bilingualism (Fishman 1972:  52-53),  in  debates as  to
whether or not to influence language use and development through various policies, in particular
when it comes to interfering with language attrition or language shift, and engaging in efforts to
bring back languages from the brink of extinction (compare the current discussions on ‘endangered
languages’). By contrast, in an early article the British linguist John R. Firth (1890-1960) stressed
the need to study what he termed the "context of situation" (Firth 1964: 66—a term that originally
goes back to the Polish-British anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski (1884-1942), and was to echo
in the work of sociologists, sociolinguists and pragmaticists throughout the decades to come; the
social semiotics of Michael Halliday (1928-) comes to mind as a prime instance. Firth’s own notion
of ‘serial  contextualization’ preludes on what Fishman came to call  ‘the dynamic sociology’ of
language  (1972:  51),  a  notion  which  comes  pretty  close  to  what  we  consider  to  be  a  ‘social
pragmatics’. And finally, among the US sociolinguists who made their mark during the past century,
one should not omit to mention the late John J. Gumperz (1928-2012), whose pioneering work
started as ‘advanced dialectology’ (in his early work on local Norwegian ways of speaking), but
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eventually matured in his studies of ‘contextualization’ that have built  bridges across territories
where few had wanted to go, in the intersection of linguistics and anthropology.
One other researcher who devoted his entire life to creating a synthesis of the two aspects
mentioned here, was the Frenchman Pierre Bourdieu (1930-2002). Starting out from his personal
experiences in Algeria during the independence wars, he gradually embraced a comprehensive view
of  human  activity;  rather  than  considering  it  a  deterministic  reaction  of  individuals  to  pre-
established conditions and emerging stimuli,  he argues that "it is necessary to abandon all theories
which explicitly or implicitly treat practice as a mechanical reaction, directly determined by the
antecedent  conditions  and  entirely  reducible  to  the  mechanical  functioning  of  pre-established
assemblies [or] models." (1979: 73) 
Individual activity does not, by itself, lead to societal organization; the fact that people act in
some kind of collectivity does not automatically index the presence of interaction. But in order to
coordinate the activities involved in social practice, humans have to communicate; the development
of language is related to this practice, in particular the tool-making and tool-using processes that are
specific for human activity and depend on communicative interaction: individuals acting with (or
against) one another and communicating against the backdrop, both of Nature and of what the Frenc
philosopher Jacques Rancière (1940-) has characterized as the "equalities and inequalities" that are
the  primordial  parameters  of  any  society,  but  in  particular  of  our  own,  late-capitalist  social
formation (Rancière 1995:19; see Mey 1985: ch. 3.3). 
A purely  descriptivist  model  of  studying  human  activity  does  not  explain  this  societally
oriented interaction; but, as Bourdieu also remarks, "the truth of the interaction is never entirely
contained in the interaction" (Bourdieu 1979: 81); it is the conditions of society that vouchsafe and
sanction the ongoing action, which always occurs in a climate of ‘equalities and inequalities'. Only
if  these oppositions  are  resolved in  common human interaction,  a  common-sense world with a
‘common-sensical’ system of values may be established. This value system is "taken for granted" by
all, "endowed with the objectivity secured by consensus on the meaning of practices and the world"
(Bourdieu 1979: 80; in Bourdieu’s elegant, but unfortunately un-translatable French, the system "va
sans dire parce qu’il vient sans dire"; ibid.). 
Even so,  the  objectivity  that  Bourdieu  talks  about  is  not  the  kind  of  objectivity  that  we
attribute to a scientific experiment; rather, it is located in the "objective intentions" of the interactive
process, and should not be confused with the subjective intentions of the interactants. For Bourdieu,
the  principle  governing  societal  interaction  is  the  human  habitus,  conceived  of  as  the
"internalization of [society’s] objective structures as dispositions" (ibid.) – which, because they are
not bound to a particular place or time or individual, are called "transposable" (‘portable’, as we
would  say  to-day,  in  our  computer-inspired  terminology).  The  habitus  is  dialectically  placed
between the objective conditions, encountered as ‘nature’ or ‘world’, and the subjective categories
through  which  we interpret  them.  The human activity  aims  at  overcoming contrasting  societal
tendencies such as:  equality vs. inequality,  fact vs. ‘view’, personal preference vs. the common
good, immigrants as threatening aliens vs. immigrants as indispensable work force, and so on and
so forth.  These oppositions are neither purely objective (in the sense that one can 'prove'  them
experimentally) nor are they created solely in the mind of the beholder, as it is often argued in
today's public debates, when it comes to discussing problems of integration and assimilation with
reference to the immigrant population. 
By stressing the role of activity and interaction in the production and reproduction of society,
Bourdieu has laid the groundwork for an objective evaluation of the societal  formation,  whose
"sexual division of labour, domestic morality, cares, strife, tastes, etc. produces the structures of the
habitus  which  become  in  turn  the  basis  of  perception  and  appreciation  of  all  subsequent
experiences" (1979: 78). Consequently, the habitus is needed to guarantee an effective practice of
communication through language, using the linguistic structures and constructions that are anchored
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in our nature and culture. In Bourdieu’s pithy formulation, "[habitus is] structured structures turning
into structuring structures" (1979: 73),  "history turned into nature" (ibid.: 78), our natura secunda,
to borrow a term originally due to Aristotle, but famously adopted by St. Augustine.
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